Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom:Arendt and Pettit in Dialogue by Rostbøll, Christian F.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom
Rostbøll, Christian F.
Published in:
To Be Unfree
DOI:
10.14361/transcript.9783839421741.19
Publication date:
2014
Document version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (APA):
Rostbøll, C. F. (2014). Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom: Arendt and Pettit in Dialogue. In C. Dahl, &
T. Andersen Nexö (Eds.), To Be Unfree: Republicanism and Unfreedom in History, Literature, and Philosophy
(pp. 19-36). Bielefelt: Transcript Verlag. Political science, No. 9
https://doi.org/10.14361/transcript.9783839421741.19
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom 
 
1 
 
Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom: Arendt and Pettit in 
Dialogue 
Christian F. Rostbøll 
In To Be Unfree: Republicanism and Unfreedom in History, Literature, and Philosophy, eds. 
Christian Dahl and Tue Andersen Nexø. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014, pp. 19-36. 
 
Historical struggles for freedom are often portrayed as born of the unbearable experience of 
oppression and, therefore, as a matter of casting off a yoke, of freeing oneself from 
something. This image, even if it does give some insight into the meaning and importance of 
freedom, gives the misleading impression that freedom is merely the absence of something, 
and that it can be understood and defined in negative terms only. To avoid this impression, 
and to appreciate that it is a misleading impression, we need a deeper understanding of the 
experiences of unfreedom, of what the other of freedom is.  
The idea that freedom must be understood in relation to its opposite is prominent in the 
republican tradition of political thought. Philip Pettit has become the most influential 
contemporary theorist of republican freedom, and he has systematically developed and 
defended a conception of freedom as non-domination (Pettit, 1997; 2001; 2008). In the 
republican tradition, according to Pettit (1997, p. 31), “liberty is always cast in terms of the 
opposition between liber and servus, citizen and slave.” In another strand of republican 
thinking, a strand that Pettit (1997, p. 8) distances himself from, stands Hannah Arendt for 
whom the extreme experience of unfreedom lies in being stateless. According to Arendt 
(1979, pp. 296f.), the plight of the stateless is “deprivation of a place in the world,” which is 
different from the situation of the slave who “still belonged to some sort of human 
community.” We find in these two republican thinkers, then, two contrasting images of 
unfreedom: slavery vs. statelessness; a contrast that, as I shall show, has important 
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implications for how we may understand freedom. Specifically, it can cast light on and 
contribute to challenging the common contrast between negative and positive conceptions of 
liberty. Moreover, it can help clarify the intrinsic and instrumental values of democracy in 
relation to freedom.  
This chapter argues that both the freedom-versus-slavery theme and the phenomenon of 
statelessness supply important insights into the meaning and importance of freedom. We 
must, therefore, bring Pettit and Arendt into dialogue, something that is rarely done because 
of needless divisions in contemporary political theory.
1
 Integrating Pettit’s insights into 
domination and Arendt’s insights into the plight of being excluded from a community that is 
responsive to one’s opinions and actions requires adjusting each position. The chapter 
analyzes differences between Pettit and Arendt related to their respective uses of slavery and 
statelessness as freedom’s other. I find three core elements that differentiate the two: First, 
there is the question of whether unfreedom requires the presence of a dominator (as the slave 
metaphor indicates), or whether unfreedom is characterized by extreme loneliness (the 
stateless). Second, there is the issue of whether unfreedom is best understood as a form of 
status (as the slave does have), or whether it means a lack of status (the stateless is apparently 
status-less). Third, does unfreedom involve being used as a means by someone else (the 
slave), or does it mean being superfluous in the eyes of others (the stateless)? The analysis 
and discussion of these three differences between slavery and statelessness as freedom’s other 
leads to a discussion of the relationship between freedom and democracy. The main question 
here is whether, or to what extent, or in what way, we should regard freedom as a positive 
notion. I also discuss whether freedom is intrinsically or only instrumentally related to 
democracy. I argue for regarding republican freedom as having positive dimensions but in a 
non-Rousseauian sense. 
                                                 
1
 Pettit’s work is mainly discussed among analytical philosophers, while Arendt’s work tends to be discussed 
exclusively by continental philosophers and political theorists. 
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The Slave and the Stateless 
 
1) The free man and the slave 
In Pettit’s understanding of the republican tradition, and in his own conception of freedom as 
non-domination, freedom is understood in contrast to slavery. The condition of the slave is to 
live “at the beck and call of a master,” and to be “in a position where fear and deference will 
be the normal order of the day” (Pettit, 1997, pp. 32, 64). Even the most fortunate slave, even 
the slave with the most permissive master, will live a life in unfreedom because she is 
“depending on [someone else’s] grace and favor” (Pettit, 1997, p. 33).The liberty-versus-
slavery theme implies, according to Pettit (1997, p. 32), that “the ultimate in unfreedom is 
having to live at the will of another – the arbitrary will of another – in the manner of the 
slave; the essence of freedom is not to have to endure such dependence and vulnerability.” 
The slave is the most extreme example of this dependence, because she is the property of 
another. Pettit gives a compelling picture of the ills that this sort of dependence entails. 
The slave metaphor serves also the more systematic purpose of showing the possibility of 
unfreedom without interference. This is essential, because Pettit believes that freedom as non-
domination is different from (and superior to) the alternative conception of freedom as non-
interference, which we know from thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and 
Isaiah Berlin. Freedom as non-domination is, like freedom as non-interference, a negative 
conception of freedom, but it is concerned with absence of domination rather than absence of 
interference. For Pettit, the republican tradition’s contrast between liberty and slavery and the 
possibility of living in slavery without being interfered with “is a sure sign of taking liberty to 
consist in non-domination rather than in non-interference” (Pettit, 1997, p. 32). For “slavery 
is essentially characterized by domination, not by actual interference: even if the slave’s 
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master proves to be entirely benign and permissive, he or she continues to dominate the 
slave” (Pettit, 1997, p. 32). This proposition, of course, requires a definition of domination as 
something different than interference. Pettit suggests that A dominates B, if A has the 
capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in certain choices that B is in a position to make 
(Pettit, 1997, p. 52). “Domination can occur without interference, because it requires only 
that someone have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in your affairs; no one need actually to 
interfere” (Pettit, 1997, p. 23). Thus, the slave metaphor, via the example of the non-
interfering master, is used to argue for the possibility of living in unfreedom without 
experiencing interference. 
To view unfreedom and domination as “a generalization of the case of slavery” (Markell, 
2008, p. 11) has some important implications. I would like to highlight three elements for our 
further discussion. First, the slave metaphor suggests that unfreedom involves a relationship 
between persons akin to that of a master and his slave. To be dominated means “being subject 
to the alien control of others” (Pettit, 2008, p. 102, emphasis added; cf. 2010, pp. 73, 75). 
Domination in this view, then, involves the presence of the dominator and unfreedom is part 
of a human relationship. Second, it is interesting to note that the slave occupies a certain 
position in society. Being a slave is a form of status (usually one legally defined) and as such 
slaves have a relation to human society. This is not something Pettit emphasizes, but it is part 
of what slavery historically has involved, and we will see its relevance in contrast to the 
phenomenon of statelessness. Third, slaves are used by their masters; they are used to serve 
the ends of their masters rather than their own. When this idea is generalized, it means that 
domination involves someone exploiting someone else for her own ends. Unfreedom, in this 
view, means being used as a means rather than as an end. 
 
2) Statelessness, membership, and humanity 
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We find Arendt’s description of statelessness in the second volume of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (Arendt, 1979, p. 267cc). The stateless are those persons who do not belong 
to and who do not have a status in any political community. Arendt’s category of the stateless 
should not be confused with (even if it can inform a discussion of) our days refugees, who 
since the 1951 Refugee Convention have had a legal status in international law. The stateless 
in Arendt’s discussion are people who have no nation of their own and/or who have been 
excluded from or stripped of their citizenship and juridical status in any other nation, as the 
Jews were by the Nazis in the 1930s. Arendt’s main concern is understanding what makes the 
stateless so vulnerable, but we might also understand the situation of the stateless in terms of 
unfreedom. Arendt’s description of statelessness as freedom’s other, which pointedly differs 
from Pettit’s liberty-slavery theme, has some interesting implications for freedom’s positive 
dimensions. I shall consider the three elements listed under Pettit above in turn. 
It is possible for a stateless person, Arendt notes, to have more freedom of movement than 
a person within a political community: a lawfully imprisoned criminal, for example. But this 
negative freedom, this absence of interference, experienced by the stateless “is due to charity 
and not to right” (Arendt, 1979, p. 296). There is a parallel here between the situation of the 
stateless and the slave and, thus, an apparent similarity to Pettit’s contention that unfreedom 
does not require interference. Clearly, neither Arendt nor Pettit see freedom as defined by 
non-interference and, in both cases, slavery and statelessness, unfreedom has something to do 
with the lack of security against arbitrary interference. But the cases of the slave and of the 
stateless differ in terms of whether lack of freedom requires the presence of a dominus. What 
is special about the situation of the stateless is that there is no one (no particular other) who 
controls or rules her; she is, rather, at the mercy of any would-be dominator. The stateless is 
also not the property of anyone, as is the slave. The plight of the stateless is not that she has 
no rights against a particular master, but that she does not have anyone to whom she can 
Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom 
 
6 
 
address herself; she does not have anywhere where she can press claims. “The fundamental 
deprivation” of the rightless, according to Arendt (1979, p. 296), “is manifested first and 
above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and 
actions effective.” The predicament of the stateless “is not that they are not equal before the 
law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even 
to oppress them” (Arendt, 1979, pp. 295c). 
“[I]n the light of recent events [totalitarianism, the holocaust],” Arendt writes (1979, p. 
297): 
  
it is possible to say that even slaves still belonged to some sort of community; their labor 
was needed, used, and exploited, and this kept them within the pale of humanity. To be a 
slave was after all to have a distinctive character, a place in society – more than the 
abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human [which is the plight of the 
stateless]. 
 
I get back to slaves being needed and used in the next paragraph; the point I want to note here 
is that while the slave has a status, the stateless does not; the latter, as Arendt sees it, is status-
less. Arendt suggests that the slave gets a character and place in society because of what she 
does or what she contributes with, her labor. But it should be noted also that the slave’s status 
is defined in legal terms and as such the slave is (in a sense) part of a human community. The 
slave has a place in and is part of both the socio-economic and the legal structure of society, 
even if she is excluded from the polis or the political life of the community. The stateless, by 
contrast, has no place whatsoever in any of these human structures. I challenge and qualify 
this description below, but here we should note the important connection to Arendt’s famous 
idea of “a right to have rights” (1979, p. 296). The right to have rights is a right to 
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membership and is prior to specific rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. What 
the stateless lack, as James Bohman (2008, p. 203) notes, is “the capability to have a status as 
such,” and the right to membership is “a right to the statuses and powers that make our 
freedom secure and allow us to be free to avoid the ills and evils that result from the loss of 
such a status.” The question that will occupy us below is whether the status of being a 
member can be understood merely in terms of security against arbitrary interference or 
whether it also has intrinsic value. 
As we just saw, slaves being needed by other human beings is what gives them a place in 
society. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt describes how the Nazis saw the Jews as 
“superfluous” (e.g. Arendt, 1979, p. 296), and in a letter to Karl Jaspers she explains that 
“making human beings as human beings superfluous [means] not using them as means to an 
end, which leaves their essence as humans untouched and impinges only on their human 
dignity; rather, making them superfluous as human beings” (Arendt & Jaspers, 1992, p. 166). 
It is not immediately clear why Arendt thinks being used as a means keeps slaves “within the 
pale of humanity,” while the Jews under Nazism were made “superfluous as human beings.” 
Nor is the distinction between violating human dignity by being used as a means and 
undermining the essence as human beings by being regarded as superfluous entirely clear. 
Aristotle, who Arendt is so fund of citing, describes the slave as a “living piece of property” 
on par with other tools and instruments (Aristotle, 1992, 1253b28-32; cf. Hansen, 1999, pp. 
120c). Does this make slaves needed as human beings? Slaves could not act in Arendt’s 
specific sense of self-disclosing action among equals in the public space (Arendt, 1958, pp. 
175-247). And action is usually what makes us (fully) human to Arendt; if one only labors, as 
the slaves does, one does not rise above the sphere of necessity and meaninglessness. How 
can slaves be part of humanity when they are deprived of the possibility of participating in the 
most human of human activities? I can see why being needed gives the slave a certain 
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security that persons who are regarded as superfluous lack, since rational people will be 
inclined to give some protection to what they need over and above what they do not need. But 
protection based on someone else’s need does not imply making the protected part of 
humanity. Clearly the slave’s humanity is not respected in the Kantian sense, which is why 
Arendt says the slave’s dignity is impinged. She must, therefore, have another understanding 
of humanity in mind when she speaks of what the stateless are excluded from and deprived 
of. I return to this other understanding of humanity below (in subsection three of the 
following section). 
 
Freedom of the City 
 
Above I have analyzed three important differences between regarding freedom’s other as 
slavery and statelessness, respectively. I have done so with little comment or criticism of the 
two theorists. In what follows I discuss the three elements – presence/absence of dominator, 
status, and being used as a means vs. superfluousness – in more detail. This discussion will 
require also consideration of further details of the views of Pettit and Arendt. This section 
will form the background of an examination of the relationship between freedom and 
democracy in the section "Freedom, Politics, and Democracy". 
 
1) Presence/absence of dominator 
In Pettit (2008, pp. 102cc) unfreedom requires the presence of someone who is in position to 
control certain of your choices, and freedom from domination requires security against such 
alien control. Moreover, the only positive dimension to freedom as non-domination that Pettit 
allows for is the requirement of the presence of security against interference on an arbitrary 
basis; the positive dimensions involved in participating in politics and self-government are 
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rejected as external to the conception (Pettit, 1997, pp. 51, 27cc). An obvious way to gain 
freedom on this basis seems to be to escape from the presence of other people who might 
dominate you; for where could one find more security against arbitrary interference than in 
the solitude of a deserted island? This issue does not arise in Arendt, it seems, for her 
description of the situation of the stateless shows not only that without rights one is in danger 
of arbitrary interference from anyone, but also – and more fundamentally – that one lacks a 
place in the human world. And lacking a place in the world means in and of itself lacking 
freedom. Actually, Pettit (1997, p. 66) denies that freedom as non-domination can be 
achieved by isolation: “Non-domination, as that is valued in the republican tradition, means 
the absence of domination in the presence of other people, not the absence of domination 
gained by isolation.” The question is whether seeing freedom as social or civil freedom – “the 
status associated with living among other people, none of whom dominates you” (Pettit, 
1997, p. 66) – is compatible with regarding security against arbitrary interference as the only 
positive dimension of freedom. Why is non-domination in the city more valuable, if one 
rejects the intrinsic values of political participation, as Pettit does? 
Perhaps the experience of the stateless can point to another, additional, positive dimension 
of freedom than slavery does? Pettit (1997, p. 66, emphasis added) merely says that the non-
domination “that is valued in the republican tradition [is] the absence of domination in the 
presence of other people,” but it is difficult to see how this can be made part of his definition 
of non-domination. This is particularly so when the only positive dimension allowed for in 
his conception of freedom is presence of security against arbitrary interference. Pettit’s 
formulations entail that there could be freedom outside the city, but that this is not the 
freedom valued by republicans. Arendt’s engagement with statelessness, in contrast, suggests 
more clearly that there can be no freedom outside a political community. Her claim is partly a 
historical and contingent claim about stateless people lacking legal protection. But when she 
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says that the plight of the stateless shows that one must be a member of a political community 
in order to have “the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a 
fellow-man” (Arendt, 1979, p. 300), her point is a deeper one. One may ask whether her 
position is the stronger one that our humanness is constituted by belonging to a political 
community or the weaker one that our humanness can appear only in political communities. I 
think the latter possibility is the more plausible interpretation. The subject that is to be free 
can appear only in a human world in which others are responsive to one’s actions and 
opinions. In this way there is a further positive dimension to freedom than mere security and 
protection, a dimension of intersubjective relationships and human responsiveness. In what 
sense this dimension is political is something to which we return. 
 
2) What kind of status 
When we see the position of the slave in contrast to that of the stateless, it becomes clear that 
the slave has a positive status that the stateless lack. As mentioned, the slave has a position in 
both the legal and the socio-economic structure of the society in which she lives. The slave 
experiences domination exactly because of her position or status in the social structure of 
society and not merely because of lack of guarantees against arbitrary interference, as Pettit 
says. The unfreedom of slaves is a product of the positive privileges that their master have 
against them. The same is true of Pettit’s other examples of dominated persons, the worker in 
capitalist society and the wife under patriarchy (Pettit, 1997, pp. 138-143). The domination of 
these categories of people is the product of social structures and institutions, of the capitalist 
division of labor and the patriarchal family. If this is right, domination does not exist by the 
mere fact that someone has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in others’ affairs but in their 
Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom 
 
11 
 
accepted right to do so.
2
 We must, therefore, distinguish between the mere capacity to 
interfere arbitrarily and the accepted right (or authority) to do so with impunity. 
At first glance, and as Arendt sometimes describes the matter, it appears that the situation 
of the stateless is to be status-less. The stateless does not occupy a position that gives others 
the right or authority to arbitrarily interfere in her affairs. The stateless is entirely outside 
legal and also economic relations. Or so it seems. It is important to remember that even if 
masters can interfere arbitrarily in the lives of their slaves with impunity, there are limits to 
how they can treat their slaves. In ancient Athens, for example, masters could not, most 
importantly, put their slaves to death with impunity (Hansen, 1999, pp. 120c). With regard to 
the stateless, there are no legal limits on how they can be treated by others, as long as being 
stateless means lacking the “right to have rights.” But can we describe the situation of the 
stateless as entirely outside of and deprived of human relationships, as Arendt does? I would 
like to suggest that being stateless is still something one is in relation to something; it cannot 
be understood in negative terms only.  
As we learn from Arendt herself, the situation of the stateless in the interwar period should 
be seen in relation to the European nation state system. “Only with a completely organized 
humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from 
humanity altogether” (Arendt, 1979, p. 297). Not having a nation state, as the Jews did not, is 
a deprivation in relation to a system that protects people on the basis of their nationality. 
Moreover, stateless was not merely something Jews (and others) were but rather something 
that was done to them. So even if the stateless have no status within any particular nation 
state, they do have a status in relation to nation states and from the perspective of the 
international system. Stateless is a status in the international political system. And it is a 
status that one is commonly pushed into. Thus, the difference between statelessness and 
                                                 
2
 As Henry Richardson (2002, p. 34) has argued, kidnappers have the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with 
people’s lives, but we do not for that reason regard them as dominating their potential victims (all of us). Cf. 
Rostbøll (2008, pp. 48c). 
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slavery cannot be understood in terms of the dichotomy between having and not having status 
in a political community. What matters for freedom is what kind of status in what kind of 
political community. 
 
3) Superfluousness vs. being used a means 
The liberty-slavery theme in Pettit implies that domination and compromising others’ 
freedom is the product of self-interest and partiality and that the misfortune of the unfree is 
similar to being someone’s else’s property, that is, being exploited and being used as a 
means. Arendt’s description of the stateless and of how the Jews and others were made 
superfluous under totalitarianism suggests, by contrast, that deprivation of freedom might be 
unconnected to self-interest and to some using others for their own ends. Rather, unfreedom 
is not to be seen and heard, not sharing a world with others. This difference has implications 
for the respective positive specifications of freedom that we might reach, beginning from 
either slavery or statelessness. In one, a central issue for freedom is whether one’s interests 
are neglected or not; in the other, the more fundamental issue for freedom is the possibility of 
acting among others in a shared world. This contrast, as we shall see below, leads to different 
views of the connection between freedom and democracy, as well as of what kind of 
democracy is required in order to respect and/or enhance freedom. 
While it is true that the stateless discussed by Arendt were not used in the direct material 
self-interest of particular masters, as slaves are, to regard the Jews as utterly superfluous for 
the Nazis is misleading. Clearly, depriving the Jews of their rights did have some function for 
Nazi Germany, for example, as creating the Other of Arian identity. As argued earlier, the 
stateless is defined in relation to something else, and not only in legal terms, but also in terms 
of identity. Still, the important insight for our further discussion is that perhaps the issue of 
being used in the interest of others is not the only or even the most fundamental dimension of 
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unfreedom. To exploit this insight we need to become clearer on what it means to being made 
superfluous as a human being, than is Arendt. First, is it being made so or being so that 
constitutes unfreedom? Second, what does it mean to be (or being made) superfluous as a 
human being? In Kant, being treated as a means implies being treated as someone who does 
not have ends of one’s own, but who exists only for the sake of others’ ends. Humanity refers 
to the rational capacity of setting ends for oneself (Kant, 1996, pp. 74cc). Arendt must mean 
something else. Here we must, I think, bring in her notion of natality, the human capacity to 
insert oneself in the human world through words and deeds. Arendt (1979, pp. 438, 454c) 
describes the stateless as being deprived of their humanity by being deprived of the capacity 
to begin. The capacity to begin belongs to all of life not merely to action, but “action has the 
closest connection with the human condition of natality” (Arendt, 1958, p. 9; see also Arendt, 
1979, p. 438). It seems that being denied the right to act politically does not entirely 
undermine the human capacity to begin something new; only the more radical being made 
superfluous does so. The ability to begin is more fundamental than the ability to have ends of 
one’s own, because it entails becoming somebody and being acknowledged as somebody 
who is welcome in a human community (cf. Markell, 2003, p. 180). The capacity to begin, 
then, requires in the first instance a human community that welcomes one as a member. It is 
this particular status of being welcome that the stateless lack. The slave is not a full member 
but also not entirely unwelcome; only those who are regarded as superfluous are not welcome 
at all.  
 
Freedom, Politics, and Democracy 
 
I have suggested that to understand freedom properly we need a positive dimension beyond 
and in addition to security against arbitrary interference. This point leads us to a discussion of 
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the relationship between freedom and politics, and in particular freedom and democracy. 
Now, one may think that the positive dimension of freedom that I am urging is the 
Rousseauian idea that in order to be free one must be the author of the laws to which one is 
subject. This is how we have learned to understand positive liberty by Isaiah Berlin (1969). 
Pettit (1997, pp. 8, 27cc) – and before him Quentin Skinner (1983; 1991, p. 202; 1998; 2002) 
– has argued that republican liberty is not a positive conception in this sense; a point I shall 
not challenge here, since I am concerned with a different possibility. Arendt, however, might 
because of her critique of liberalism and negative liberty be seen as advocating a positive 
conception of freedom. But if she does so, it is not freedom in the sense of Rousseauian 
popular sovereignty (Canovan, 1992, p. 212). Rousseau represents for Arendt, just as much as 
liberalism does, a wrongheaded tradition that regards politics in terms of sovereignty and 
ruling (Rostbøll, 2006, p. 308; 2010, pp. 32cc). Thus, neither Arendt nor Pettit hold a positive 
conception of freedom in the sense of collective self-rule, nor is that the positive dimension of 
freedom that I shall explore below. 
Another way of regarding the relationship between democracy and freedom is to ask 
whether democracy is intrinsic to freedom or whether it is instrumental to freedom. To say 
that the relationship between democracy and freedom is an intrinsic one is to hold that 
democracy is an inherent part of freedom, and that freedom is not merely an external 
consequence of democratic decision making. On the intrinsic argument there is something in 
democracy that makes us free. By participating in (or perhaps by having the opportunity to 
participate in) democratic politics, citizens are free. To say that democracy is instrumental to 
freedom is to hold that the value of democracy in relationship to freedom is that of a means 
that furthers a valuable end. In the instrumental justification, democracy has no value in itself 
but only the value it derives from being a means to freedom. Now, it seems that the intrinsic 
argument gives a stronger foundation to democracy than the instrumental one, because the 
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first gives democracy unconditional value while the instrumental connection, by its nature, is 
a contingent and conditional one. 
How can we place the republican conception of freedom in relation to the distinction 
drawn in the previous paragraph? Pettit explicitly denies that the relationship between 
democracy and freedom is intrinsic and notes that the importance of democratic control 
comes “from the fact that it is a means of furthering liberty” (1997, p. 30, emphasis added). 
Still, Pettit thinks Berlin’s famous conclusion that there is no necessary connection between 
freedom and democracy exhibits a shortcoming of freedom as non-interference (Berlin, 1969, 
p. 130; Pettit, 1999, pp. 168cc). While Berlin notes that democracies might be better at 
protecting freedom (as non-interference) than non-democracies, he sees this as a contingent 
matter. Pettit, in opposition to Berlin, wants to show that democratized states represent a 
lesser assault on republican freedom than nondemocratic ones, and not just contingently but 
“just in virtue of being democratized” (1999, p. 163). His aim is to show that coercive law 
and government is not necessarily the enemy of liberty, and that democratization is what is 
required for law and government not to be dominating or hostile to freedom. What is 
noteworthy in Pettit’s republicanism is the attempt to show such a relationship between 
freedom and democracy without appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic participation 
or to the idea that a law given by the people cannot dominate the people. Pettit’s position, 
then, seems to be that the relationship between democracy and freedom is instrumental but 
nonetheless robust (Rostbøll 2014). 
Let us look at why Pettit thinks the relationship between democracy and freedom is robust 
(yet not intrinsic). Recall that for Pettit freedom is not defined as absence of interference but 
rather as non-domination. This means, according to Pettit, not only that there can be 
domination without interference (as in the case of the non-interfering master), but also that 
there can be interference without domination. The decisive question is whether the 
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interference is arbitrary or not. What democratic governments do, according to Pettit, is to 
substitute one form of interference with a completely different kind. And, “interference 
occurs without the loss of liberty when the interference is not arbitrary and does not represent 
a form of domination” (Pettit, 1997, p. 35). Interference is non-arbitrary when it is “designed 
to track people’s interests according to their ideas” (Pettit, 1997, p. 149), or more precisely, 
“to the extent that it is forced to track people’s common avowable interests” (Pettit 2001, p. 
139; cf. 1999, p. 176). Thus, democracy is robustly connected to freedom, in Pettit’s view, 
because it is a form of government that is designed and forced to track people’s interests as 
they see them and to interfere exclusively on that basis.  
One may ask here whether the emphasis showing the robust relationship consist in that 
democracy is designed to track people’s interests or rather in the idea that democracy is 
designed to track people’s interests. The first possibility entails an outcome based view of 
democracy that is susceptible to the criticism that democracies cannot provide an infallible 
method for making non-arbitrary decisions that track and track only common avowable 
interests (Bellamy, 2008, pp. 164cc). The second possibility has the tendency to turn the view 
into an intrinsic one. If what makes democracy valuable is that it is designed to treat 
everyone’s interests equally, its value comes not from the fact that democratic decisions 
actually do so, but rather from the equal status afforded everyone in the democratic process. I 
believe the latter argument would be the stronger one, but Pettit has excluded himself from 
endorsing this view because of his rejection of any intrinsic justification of democracy. He 
fails to see that there are other intrinsic justifications of democracy than Rousseauian and 
perfectionist ones, the first involving collective self-rule and the latter relying on political 
participation being the highest form of life. 
It is an assumption of Pettit’s view of the relationship between democracy and freedom 
that the core (and only) complaint one can have against one’s oppressors or the government is 
Statelessness, Domination, and Unfreedom 
 
17 
 
that one’s interests are not tracked. He follows the classical view, which has its roots in 
Aristotle (1992, 1279a22-b10), that deviated forms of government are characterized by the 
rulers governing in their own as opposed to the common interest. Arendt (1979, pp. 460cc), 
in contrast, believes that 20
th
 century totalitarianism exploded this distinction between 
arbitrary and legitimate government because the leaders of the totalitarian movements did not 
rule in their own interest. She emphasizes over and again that the horrors of totalitarianism 
cannot be understood in terms of treating others as means or exploiting them for one’s own 
ends. This is relevant for understanding Arendt’s alternative view of the relationship between 
democracy and freedom. To be excluded from a place in the human world and from political 
participation entails a different and more fundamental unfreedom than one’s interests not 
being tracked and incorporated in political decisions. What exactly this unfreedom consist in 
and why it is an unfreedom is complicated, but it has to do with the lack of possibility to 
speak and act, to be heard and seen. And clearly it is actively engaging in these activities, and 
being responded to when one does so – rather than any consequences that may accrue from 
this – that is of value and necessary for freedom. 
To be heard and seen is related to the capacity to become somebody, to natality or the 
capacity to begin. In The Human Condition, Arendt writes that beginning “is not the 
beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginner himself” (1958, p. 177). The 
ability to begin is a precondition of becoming somebody, of gaining individuality and having 
and attaining status. When someone begins, she distinguishes herself “instead of being 
merely distinct” (Arendt, 1958, p. 176). The beginner is not merely ascribed an identity by 
others but shows in word and deed, by her own initiative, who she is. This possibility of 
becoming somebody, which the stateless lacked, is prior to and existentially more 
fundamental than having interests or ends. Becoming somebody is a precondition of having 
ends at all. Having one’s interests tracked in Pettit’s sense is also not sufficient for becoming 
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somebody, for in that case one is only a “what,” someone who has interests that she shares 
with many others, and not a “who,” which distinguishes her from “anyone else who ever 
lived, lives, or will live” (Arendt, 1958, p. 8). 
Which view of the relationship between democracy and freedom is implied by Arendt’s 
view as outlined above? And what kind of democracy is required for freedom in this view? 
Freedom entails, as we just saw, becoming somebody, becoming a distinct individual. The 
stateless, the person outside politics, according to Arendt (1979, p. 302), is “other,” but since 
he is “without a citizenship, without an opinion, without a deed by which to identify and 
specify himself,” he is merely “different in general, representing nothing but his own absolute 
unique individuality which, deprived of expression within and action upon a common world, 
loses all significance.” What is it, then, that democratic politics does for freedom? It 
organizes and guarantees a common public space in which people can meet each other, a 
space “into which each of the free men [can] insert himself by word and deed” (Arendt 1993, 
p. 148). This helps explain why the value of democracy for Arendt lies in participation, rather 
than in interest representation. For Arendt (1990, p. 235, pp. 268c) “expressing, discussing, 
and deciding” are “in a positive sense [...] the activities of freedom,” while having one’s 
interests represented through voting is not. 
We are now able to see the contours of a core difference between Pettit’s and Arendt’s 
view of the relation between democracy and freedom. The difference can be understood in 
terms of a distinction between control and involvement suggested by Patchen Markell (2008, 
p. 12). When Pettit says that democracy is robustly connected to freedom, because democracy 
secures that political decisions track common interests, this is a matter of politics being 
controlled by citizens’ common interests. When the question of the relationship between 
political power and freedom is phrased as a matter of involvement, the question is: “whatever 
it is that’s happening, and, however it’s being controlled, to what extent is it happening 
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through you, through your activity” (Markell, 2008, p. 12). Now, sometimes control and 
involvement go hand in hand, but it is also possible that “the mechanisms that guard against 
arbitrariness and subject decisions to control [...] displace involvement” (Markell, 2008, p. 
12). While the latter possibility falls out of view (or is not regretted) in Pettit and explains his 
rather minimalist view of democracy, the issue of involvement is fundamental in Arendt and 
explains her criticism of representative democracy as “oligarchic” (Arendt, 1990, p. 269). 
In Arendt there are two strands of thought – perhaps two positive dimensions of freedom – 
that goes further than Pettit’s account of freedom as non-domination: one concerns 
membership, and the other political participation. One may argue that Arendt does not 
sufficiently distinguish the value of being a member of a political community and the value 
of active involvement in politics. Actually there are two issues here. First, it is unclear 
whether the value in both cases is merely instrumental (being a means to secure life and 
liberty) or intrinsic (valuable in itself, as an expression and the essence of freedom). Second, 
if there is intrinsic value in being a member of a human community, can this be enjoyed only 
as an active participant in politics? The latter is a controversial view, which seems to exclude 
the possibility that most people find more fulfillment in the private sphere than in politics. 
While it is possible to find places in Arendt’s writings that commit her to the latter view, I 
think this objection fails to see the force of her position. Even if most people “would rather 
cultivate their garden than the common good” (Bellamy, 2008, p. 162), it doesn’t follow that 
having the status of someone’s whose actions and opinions are responded to is not 
intrinsically valuable and part of what freedom means. It might be that this status is not 
exclusive to politics, but understanding (political) action as Arendt does in The Human 
Condition helps us understand its distinctiveness and value. Arendt’s celebration of political 
involvement should be seen as the sharpest possible contrast to being stateless, and her point 
might be that if we don’t understand the value of political action, we may not understand the 
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value of being a member of a political community, and therefore may not understand what 
freedom means and requires (Arendt, 1993, p. 148). 
Now, it is an important objection to intrinsic and noninstrumental justifications of 
democracy that they cannot on their own explain the importance of democratic procedures, 
for this we need also some idea of which procedures make for epistemically good decisions 
(Estlund, 2008, ch. 4 & 5). With regard to Arendt’s position the problem is that the intrinsic 
value of political participation might be a mere by-product of aiming at substantial outcomes; 
political participation requires an instrumental aim to be valuable (Elster, 1997, pp. 19cc). 
The intrinsic value of political participation is conditional upon its instrumental value. But 
this does not mean that the noninstrumental value of democracy has no weight of its own. As 
Elizabeth Anderson (2009, p. 225) has pointed out: 
 
The proper test of the noninstrumental goodness of an activity is not whether we’d prefer 
to do it, even if it didn’t result in desirable consequences. It is rather whether we’d still 
prefer to engage in it, even if the same consequences could be brought about by other 
(passive) means. 
 
Of course, Arendt does not think that the value of belonging to a political community could 
be achieved by other means, but she goes too far in ignoring the instrumental dimension of 
democratic politics (Habermas, 1985). Here Pettit’s idea that democratic procedures must be 
designed to track common interests comes into its own. It is an important part of the 
justification of democracy that it has instrumental value in tending to making non-arbitrary 
decisions that promote the interests of everyone equally. The dialogue between Pettit and 
Arendt, thus, points to the need to combine intrinsic and instrumental justifications of 
democracy. 
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Conclusion 
 
Arendt’s understanding of the experience of the stateless highlights what it means to “lack 
common liberty held with others” (Bohman, 2008, p. 206) in a way that Pettit’s use of the 
slave metaphor and his conceptualization of non-domination as security against arbitrary 
interference does not. This difference has implications also for their view of the raison d’être 
of democratic politics, which for Pettit is to secure that interference is non-dominating by 
tracking common avowable interests, while it for Arendt is to secure the conditions of acting 
together in common liberty, creating a world where everyone can become somebody by her 
own initiative. Thus, Pettit’s concern for exploitation and control can be traced back to the 
liberty-slavery theme, while Arendt’s concern for involvement can be seen in light of her 
discussion of totalitarianism and statelessness. The argument of this chapter is that while both 
the use of the slave metaphor and the description of statelessness are suggestive and lead to 
valuable insights, they also result in blind-spots in Pettit’s and Arendt’s respective 
understandings of democracy and freedom and their relationship. Neither the exploitation of 
the slave, nor the superfluousness of the stateless can stand alone as freedom’s other. 
The dialogue between Arendt and Pettit has helped us approach an understanding of which 
positive dimensions republican freedom has and does not have. I have argued that there is a 
further positive dimension to freedom than mere security against arbitrary interference. The 
additional positive dimension is the capacity to become somebody by inserting oneself in a 
common world, which is responsive to one’s opinions and actions – and not merely to one’s 
interests. This argument has implication for how we should view the relationship between 
democracy and freedom. I have suggested some distinctions that make new possibilities 
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apparent, for example, that one can regard democracy as robustly connected to freedom 
without seeing the connection as intrinsic, and that one can be committed to an intrinsic 
justification of democracy without this relying on a Rousseauian idea of collective self-rule 
or on the idea that political participation is the only truly good life. In the end, I argued for 
(what we might call) a dual justification of democracy and freedom that includes both 
intrinsic and instrumental concerns. Democracy is valuable both because it affords everyone 
the possibility of becoming somebody and holding common liberty with others, and because 
it has the instrumental value of protecting citizens against arbitrary decisions and domination. 
And, it should be emphasized, the value of holding common liberty with others goes beyond 
being a means to ensuring that one’s avowable interests are tracked on an equal footing with 
others’ interests. We would and should, I propose, still prefer being active members of 
political communities that welcome and are responsive to our actions and opinions, even if 
non-arbitrary decision making could be secured by other means. 
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